作者
Don Marquis
发表日期
2008/6/1
期刊
Journal of Medical Ethics
卷号
34
期号
6
页码范围
422-426
出版商
Institute of Medical Ethics
简介
According to the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion, the best explanation for the presumptive serious wrongness of killing innocent post-natal children and adults is that killing them deprives them of all of the goods of life that they would have experienced had they not been killed. These future goods can be called their ‘‘futures of value’’. Fetuses have futures (very much!) like ours. Therefore, given some assumptions, ending their lives is seriously presumptively wrong, or so the argument goes. 1i The future of value argument has two parts.(1) It is an account of what is sufficient to make killing presumptively seriously wrong in the cases of all those individuals whom, we all agree, it is wrong to kill.(2) It endorses the implication that it is presumptively seriously wrong to end the life of a fetus. In the first part of this essay I briefly shall discuss the virtues of the future of value account of the wrongness of …
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