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In this essay Marquis distinguishes his position," the future-like-ours account"(FLO) from other related but different positions and argues that neither McInerney nor Paske defeats his argument. Moreover, the personhood strategy has severe difficulties of its own which make it less satisfactory than the future-like-ours account.

ACCORDING TO THE FUTURE-LIKE-OURS ACCOUNT of the ethics of abortion (hereafter, the FLO account) depriving an individual of a future like ours is what makes killing that individual wrong. Surely the misfortune of premature death underlies the wrongness of killing. People who have cancer or AIDS do regard the loss of their futures as constituting the misfortune of their premature deaths. Ending the life of a fetus involves depriving it of a future like ours. If the misfortune of premature death is what underlies the wrongness of killing, and if the deprivation of a future like ours is what underlies the misfortune of premature death, and if ending the life of a fetus involves depriving it of a future like ours, then ending the life of a fetus is presumptively wrong. Accordingly, abortion is presumptively wrong. Since the presumption that killing a human being is wrong is a very strong presumption, the presumption that abortion is wrong is a very strong presumption. The main, although certainly not the only, competitor to this FLO account of the ethics of abortion is the personhood strategy. On standard versions of this strategy, some account is given of the concept of person. Then it is argued that because fetuses are not persons they do not have the right to life and because fetuses do not have the right to life, abortion is morally permissible. 2