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Like most defenders of the moral claims of animals, I consider those claims to be much more extensive than most people do. The philosophical defender of animals faces an odd problem. In other philosophical debates, at least many of them, the opposing sides are fairly well represented in the literature, so that you know what you have to argue against. But this is not true in the case of what has come to be called “animal ethics.” People who think that the way we now treat animals is morally justified do not tend to write about it. So part of my task in Part I,“Human Beings and the Other Animals,” is to identify the grounds of the opposing view and say what I think is wrong with them. In Chapter 1, I raise the question whether people are more important than the other animals—whether what is good-for us just matters more than what is good-for them—and I argue that these claims do not really make sense. This is because goodness and importance are, as I call it,“tethered.” What I mean by that is that everything that is good must be good-for someone, and everything that is important must be important-to someone. There is no point of view from which we can plausibly give a rank ordering of the subjects for whom things are good, or to whom things are important. In Chapter 2, I offer a theory of the good which supports this “tethered” conception of value. The theory is derived from Aristotle. Any object is in a functionally good condition when it