作者
Xuesong Geng, Toru Yoshikawa, Asli M Colpan
发表日期
2016/7
期刊
Strategic Management Journal
卷号
37
期号
7
页码范围
1472-1492
出版商
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
简介
Research summary: We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic.
Managerial summary: Why have …
学术搜索中的文章
X Geng, T Yoshikawa, AM Colpan - Strategic Management Journal, 2016