作者
Jenny de Fine Licht, Daniel Naurin
发表日期
2015/6/26
期刊
Secrecy and publicity in votes and debates
卷号
131
出版商
Cambridge University Press
简介
Theorizing about the implications of having decision-making procedures that are open to the public view usually focuses on the actions of those being exposed to publicity. Publicity and secrecy, it is expected, creates different incentives for decision makers, which induce them to take different actions with respect to voting and debating. The reason why different incentives are created is that publicity introduces an audience. Most of the work in the field looks at the relationship in that direction (see, for example, Elster 1998b, Groseclose and McCarty 2001, Lindstedt and Naurin 2010, MacCoun 2006, Naurin 2007, Prat 2005, Stasavage 2004, Vermeule 2009). This chapter also studies the relationship between actors and audience, but with the causal order reversed. Rather than asking what the effect of lifting the curtain is on those being observed on stage, we look at the effect on those observing the show. How does the public react when it gets the possibility to observe the votes, debates, and other types of actions on which political decisions are based?
A common answer to this question is that openness increases the perceived legitimacy of the decisions taken. The public is more willing to believe that the appointed decision makers have the right to make these decisions, and that these decisions should be accepted, when decision-making procedures are open to the public view. From governments’ point of view, this is an important motive behind openness reforms.
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J de Fine Licht, D Naurin - Secrecy and publicity in votes and debates, 2015