作者
Claudio Canella, Daniel Genkin, Lukas Giner, Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Marina Minkin, Daniel Moghimi, Frank Piessens, Michael Schwarz, Berk Sunar, Jo Van Bulck, Yuval Yarom
发表日期
2019
研讨会论文
The 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2019)
简介
Meltdown and Spectre enable arbitrary data leakage from memory via various side channels. Short-term software mitigations for Meltdown are only a temporary solution with a significant performance overhead. Due to hardware fixes, these mitigations are disabled on recent processors. In this paper, we show that Meltdown-like attacks are still possible on recent CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown. We identify two behaviors of the store buffer, a microarchitectural resource to reduce the latency for data stores, that enable powerful attacks. The first behavior, Write Transient Forwarding forwards data from stores to subsequent loads even when the load address differs from that of the store. The second, Store-to-Leak exploits the interaction between the TLB and the store buffer to leak metadata on store addresses. Based on these, we develop multiple attacks and demonstrate data leakage, control flow recovery …
引用总数
201920202021202220232024197883947534
学术搜索中的文章
C Canella, D Genkin, L Giner, D Gruss, M Lipp… - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on …, 2019
M Minkin, D Moghimi, M Lipp, M Schwarz, J Van Bulck… - arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12701, 2019
M Minkin, D Moghimi, M Lipp, M Schwarz, J Van Bulck… - arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12701, 2019