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Anyone who has carefully worked through both Hume’s Treatise and his two principal later works, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, must have noticed a remarkable gap in those later works: the associationist account of sympathy from the Treatise has gone missing. 1 This mysterious disappearance is all the more puzzling given Hume’s obvious fondness for this part of his theory in the Treatise. The general principle of the association of ideas is pronounced in the Abstract to the Treatise to be the greatest discovery of that work, and once the application of this principle to sympathy is made in Book 2, the account which results is simply utilized too many times in the remainder of the Treatise to bother counting. 2 Indeed, not only does Hume end up crediting sympathy as the source of our moral sentiments in the Treatise, he also remarks in the …