作者
Reza Yaesoubi, Stephen D Roberts
发表日期
2011/12/1
期刊
Journal of health economics
卷号
30
期号
6
页码范围
1188-1196
出版商
North-Holland
简介
We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser–health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.
学术搜索中的文章
R Yaesoubi, SD Roberts - Journal of health economics, 2011