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Scholars across a variety of disciplines have come to believe that eighteenthcentury luminaries such as David Hume and Adam Smith were correct to see our normative judgements as sentiments–that is, as integrating both affective and cognitive elements, both emotions and beliefs. There are several ways to defend this thesis (Frazer 2013: 21–4). Psychologists, neuroscientists, and other social scientists have gathered considerable evidence that normative judgements depend on emotions (eg Damasio 1994; Marcus et al. 2000; Haidt 2001; Westen 2007). Philosophers have then explored the deeper implications of these empirical discoveries (eg Nichols 2004; Prinz 2007). Normative ethicists and political theorists have argued that emotional engagements ought to be appreciated as positive features of our ethical and political lives (eg Walzer 2004; Hall 2005; Krause 2008; Frazer 2010; Slote 2010). During the first half of the twentieth century, many analytic metaethicists even argued that the very concept of affectless evaluation is incoherent (Ayer 1936: 102–19; Stevenson 1944). Under a particularly strong version of this metaethical view–often defended under such names as emotivism, non-cognitivism or expressivism–moral judgements consist only of emotion, and contain no cognitive content whatsoever. Among metaethicists today, moderate, qualified, hybrid or ‘neosentimentalist’views are more popular (eg Gibbard 1990; D’Arms and Jacobson 2000). Given the long-standing centrality of emotion in analytic metaethics, it is surprising that sentimentalism is only now gaining a foothold in Anglo-American political theory. Some might see this …