Democracy and dictatorship revisited JA Cheibub, J Gandhi, JR Vreeland Public choice 143, 67-101, 2010 | 3010 | 2010 |
The IMF and economic development JR Vreeland Cambridge University Press, 2003 | 1239 | 2003 |
The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy JR Vreeland Journal of conflict Resolution 52 (3), 401-425, 2008 | 922 | 2008 |
The effect of IMF programs on economic growth A Przeworski, JR Vreeland Journal of development Economics 62 (2), 385-421, 2000 | 906 | 2000 |
Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? A Dreher, JE Sturm, JR Vreeland Journal of development economics 88 (1), 1-18, 2009 | 843 | 2009 |
Democracy and transparency JR Hollyer, BP Rosendorff, JR Vreeland The Journal of Politics 73 (4), 1191-1205, 2011 | 594 | 2011 |
Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council A Dreher, JE Sturm, JR Vreeland European Economic Review 53 (7), 742-757, 2009 | 590 | 2009 |
Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture JR Vreeland International Organization 62 (1), 65-101, 2008 | 556 | 2008 |
The International Monetary Fund (IMF): politics of conditional lending JR Vreeland Routledge, 2006 | 369 | 2006 |
The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and influence JR Vreeland, A Dreher Cambridge University Press, 2014 | 353 | 2014 |
Measuring transparency JR Hollyer, BP Rosendorff, JR Vreeland Political analysis 22 (4), 413-434, 2014 | 272 | 2014 |
Transparency, protest, and autocratic instability JR Hollyer, BP Rosendorff, JR Vreeland American Political Science Review 109 (4), 764-784, 2015 | 242 | 2015 |
Extreme bounds of democracy M Gassebner, MJ Lamla, JR Vreeland Journal of conflict resolution 57 (2), 171-197, 2013 | 237 | 2013 |
The effect of IMF programs on labor JR Vreeland World Development 30 (1), 121-139, 2002 | 231 | 2002 |
Politics and IMF conditionality A Dreher, JE Sturm, JR Vreeland Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (1), 120-148, 2015 | 229 | 2015 |
The costs of favoritism: is politically driven aid less effective? A Dreher, S Klasen, JR Vreeland, E Werker Economic Development and Cultural Change 62 (1), 157-191, 2013 | 196 | 2013 |
Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? Statistically selected cases JR Vreeland International Political Science Review 24 (3), 321-343, 2003 | 178 | 2003 |
Regional organizations and international politics: Japanese influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council DYM Lim, JR Vreeland World Politics 65 (1), 34-72, 2013 | 166 | 2013 |
The IMF: lender of last resort or scapegoat JR Vreeland Yale University, 1999 | 164 | 1999 |
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies JR Vreeland The Review of International Organizations 1, 359-378, 2006 | 142 | 2006 |