Executive compensation as an agency problem LA Bebchuk, JM Fried Journal of economic perspectives 17 (3), 71-92, 2003 | 3900 | 2003 |
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation L Bebchuk, JM Fried Harvard University Press, 2006 | 3303 | 2006 |
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker National bureau of economic research, 2002 | 2980 | 2002 |
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues LA Bebchuk, JM Fried US Corporate Governance, 113-143, 2009 | 1173 | 2009 |
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy LA Bebchuk, JM Fried Yale Lj 105, 857, 1995 | 737 | 1995 |
Pay without performance L Bebchuk, J Fried Harvard University Press, 2004 | 488 | 2004 |
Paying for long-term performance LA Bebchuk, JM Fried University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1915-1959, 2010 | 438 | 2010 |
Agency costs of venture capitalist control in startups JM Fried, M Ganor NYUL rev. 81, 967, 2006 | 291 | 2006 |
Reducing the profitability of corporate insider trading through pretrading disclosure JM Fried S. Cal. L. Rev. 71, 303, 1997 | 217 | 1997 |
Stealth compensation via retirement benefits LA Bebchuk, J Fried National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004 | 162 | 2004 |
Informed trading and false signaling with open market repurchases JM Fried Calif. L. Rev. 93, 1323, 2005 | 154 | 2005 |
The uneasy case for favoring long-term shareholders JM Fried Yale LJ 124, 1554, 2014 | 152 | 2014 |
Insider signaling and insider trading with repurchase tender offers JM Fried The University of Chicago Law Review, 421-477, 2000 | 150 | 2000 |
Excess-pay clawbacks J Fried J. Corp. l. 36, 721, 2010 | 133 | 2010 |
Executive compensation in America: optimal contracting or extraction of rents? LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001 | 133 | 2001 |
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy: further thoughts and a reply to critics LA Bebchuk, J Fried National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998 | 125 | 1998 |
Rationalizing criminal forfeiture DJ Fried J. Crim. L. & Criminology 79, 328, 1988 | 124 | 1988 |
Executive compensation at Fannie Mae: A case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage LA Bebchuk, JM Fried J. Corp. L. 30, 807, 2004 | 119 | 2004 |
Open market repurchases: signaling or managerial opportunism? JM Fried Theoretical inquiries in Law 2 (2), 2001 | 117 | 2001 |
Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed firms B Broughman, J Fried Journal of Financial Economics 95 (3), 384-399, 2010 | 97 | 2010 |