Probabilistic Knowledge S Moss Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 | 395 | 2018 |
On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary S Moss Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (5), 1-81, 2015 | 180 | 2015 |
Moral encroachment S Moss Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018 | 172 | 2018 |
On the pragmatics of counterfactuals S Moss Noûs 46 (3), 561-86, 2012 | 142 | 2012 |
Epistemology formalized S Moss Philosophical Review 122 (1), 1-43, 2013 | 132 | 2013 |
Time-slice epistemology and action under indeterminacy S Moss Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5, 172-94, 2015 | 104 | 2015 |
Updating as communication S Moss Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2), 225-48, 2012 | 104 | 2012 |
Scoring rules and epistemic compromise S Moss Mind 120 (480), 1053-69, 2011 | 78 | 2011 |
Credal dilemmas S Moss Noûs 49 (4), 665-83, 2015 | 65 | 2015 |
Subjunctive credences and semantic humility S Moss Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2), 251-78, 2013 | 45 | 2013 |
Knowledge and legal proof S Moss Oxford studies in epistemology 7, 176-213, 2021 | 43 | 2021 |
Full belief and loose speech S Moss Philosophical Review, 2019 | 38 | 2019 |
Solving the color incompatibility problem S Moss Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5), 841-51, 2012 | 35 | 2012 |
Four-dimensionalist theories of persistence S Moss Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4), 671-86, 2012 | 22 | 2012 |
Global constraints on imprecise credences: Solving reflection violations, belief inertia, and other puzzles S Moss Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3), 620-638, 2021 | 13* | 2021 |
The role of linguistics in the philosophy of language S Moss Routledge companion to the philosophy of language. Routledge, 2012 | 11 | 2012 |
Pragmatic encroachment and legal proof S Moss Philosophical Issues 31 (1), 258-79, 2021 | 7 | 2021 |
Replies to Edgington, Pavese, and Campbell-Moore and Konek S Moss Analysis 80 (2), 356-370, 2020 | 3 | 2020 |
Précis of probabilistic knowledge S Moss Res Philosophica 97 (1), 93-96, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |