| Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence V Conitzer, W Sinnott-Armstrong, JS Borg, Y Deng, M Kramer Thirty-first AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017 | 207 | 2017 |
| Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021, 3965-3973, 2021 | 57 | 2021 |
| Homotopy analysis for tensor PCA A Anandkumar, Y Deng, R Ge, H Mobahi Conference on Learning Theory, 79-104, 2017 | 53 | 2017 |
| Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 17777-17788, 2021 | 51 | 2021 |
| Strategizing against no-regret learners Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan Advances in neural information processing systems 32, 2019 | 51 | 2019 |
| The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Available at SSRN 3785579, 2021 | 47 | 2021 |
| Prior-free dynamic auctions with low regret buyers Y Deng, J Schneider, B Sivan Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019 | 29 | 2019 |
| Approximately efficient bilateral trade Y Deng, J Mao, B Sivan, K Wang Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2022 | 26 | 2022 |
| Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10650, 2022 | 23 | 2022 |
| Multi-channel autobidding with budget and ROI constraints Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni International Conference on Machine Learning, 7617-7644, 2023 | 19 | 2023 |
| Fairness in the autobidding world with machine-learned advice Y Deng, N Golrezaei, P Jaillet, JCN Liang, V Mirrokni arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04748 4, 2022 | 17 | 2022 |
| Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clipping S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Columbia Business School Research Paper, 2022 | 17 | 2022 |
| A robust non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism for contextual auctions Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32, 2019 | 16* | 2019 |
| A data-driven metric of incentive compatibility Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 1796-1806, 2020 | 15 | 2020 |
| Robust pricing in dynamic mechanism design Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni International Conference on Machine Learning, 2494-2503, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
| Disarmament games Y Deng, V Conitzer Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017 | 10 | 2017 |
| Prior-independent dynamic auctions for a value-maximizing buyer Y Deng, H Zhang Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 13847-13858, 2021 | 9 | 2021 |
| Non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism design with budget constraints and beyond Y Deng, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Available at SSRN 3383231, 2019 | 9 | 2019 |
| Testing dynamic incentive compatibility in display ad auctions Y Deng, S Lahaie Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge …, 2019 | 9 | 2019 |
| Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm Y Deng, W Shen, P Tang Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
Vahab MirrokniGoogle Fellow, VP, Google Research在 google.com 的电子邮件经过验证
