| Automated mechanism design via neural networks W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2019 | 88 | 2019 |
| Learning optimal strategies to commit to B Peng, W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 2149-2156, 2019 | 61 | 2019 |
| Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021, 3965-3973, 2021 | 57 | 2021 |
| Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo Econometrica 88 (5), 1939-1963, 2020 | 52 | 2020 |
| Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34, 17777-17788, 2021 | 51 | 2021 |
| Dynamic Auctions with Bank Accounts V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 387--393, 2016 | 49 | 2016 |
| The landscape of auto-bidding auctions: Value versus utility maximization SR Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, VS Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 132-133, 2021 | 47 | 2021 |
| An economic approach to vehicle dispatching for ride sharing M Chen, W Shen, P Tang, S Zuo Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial …, 2019 | 43* | 2019 |
| Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.08840, 2016 | 32 | 2016 |
| Tighter relations between sensitivity and other complexity measures A Ambainis, M Bavarian, Y Gao, J Mao, X Sun, S Zuo Automata, Languages, and Programming: 41st International Colloquium, ICALP …, 2014 | 31 | 2014 |
| Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best S Balseiro, V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, S Zuo SODA 2019, 2018 | 27* | 2018 |
| Incentive-aware learning for large markets A Epasto, M Mahdian, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, 1369-1378, 2018 | 26* | 2018 |
| Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, H Zhang, S Zuo arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10650, 2022 | 23 | 2022 |
| Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2022 | 17 | 2022 |
| Bayesian nash equilibrium in first-price auction with discrete value distributions Z Wang, W Shen, S Zuo Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2020 | 16 | 2020 |
| Optimal machine strategies to commit to in two-person repeated games S Zuo, P Tang Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 29 (1), 2015 | 16 | 2015 |
| A data-driven metric of incentive compatibility Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni, S Zuo Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020, 1796-1806, 2020 | 15 | 2020 |
| Dynamic mechanism design in the field V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, R Ren, S Zuo Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, 1359-1368, 2018 | 13 | 2018 |
| Calibrated Click-Through Auctions D Bergemann, P Duetting, R Paes Leme, S Zuo Proceedings of the Web Conference 2022, 2022 | 12 | 2022 |
| Optimal dynamic auctions are virtual welfare maximizers V Mirrokni, R Paes Leme, P Tang, S Zuo Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 2125-2132, 2019 | 12 | 2019 |
Vahab MirrokniGoogle Fellow, VP, Google Research在 google.com 的电子邮件经过验证
