| A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being G Fletcher Utilitas 25 (2), 206-20, 2013 | 266 | 2013 |
| The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction G Fletcher Routledge, 2016 | 217 | 2016 |
| Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being TJ VanderWeele, C Trudel-Fitzgerald, P Allin, C Farrelly, G Fletcher, ... Preventive Medicine 133, 106004, 2020 | 176 | 2020 |
| Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being G Fletcher Routledge, 2016 | 143 | 2016 |
| Objective list theories G Fletcher The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-being, 148-160, 2016 | 118 | 2016 |
| Moral Testimony: Once More With Feeling G Fletcher Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11, 45-73, 2016 | 59 | 2016 |
| Having It Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics G Fletcher, M Ridge OUP USA, 2014 | 49 | 2014 |
| The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended G Fletcher JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 6 (1), 2012 | 42 | 2012 |
| Sentimental Value G Fletcher The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1), 55-65, 2009 | 41 | 2009 |
| VARIABLE VERSUS FIXED‐RATE RULE‐UTILITARIANISM B Hooker, G Fletcher The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231), 344-352, 2008 | 28 | 2008 |
| Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism G Fletcher Philosophical Papers 38 (1), 21-34, 2009 | 26 | 2009 |
| Dear Prudence: the nature and normativity of prudential discourse G Fletcher Oxford University Press, 2021 | 21 | 2021 |
| Pain for the moral error theory? A new companions-in-guilt argument G Fletcher Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3), 474-482, 2018 | 21 | 2018 |
| The consistency of qualitative hedonism and the value of (at least some) malicious pleasures G Fletcher Utilitas 20 (4), 462, 2008 | 19 | 2008 |
| Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature G Fletcher Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories in Meta-Normative Theory, 2014 | 17 | 2014 |
| Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse G Fletcher The Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277), 699-720, 2019 | 16 | 2019 |
| Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value G Fletcher Philosophical studies, 1-15, 2011 | 15 | 2011 |
| Taking Prudence Seriously G Fletcher Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14, 70-94, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
| Needing and necessity G Fletcher Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8, 170-192, 2018 | 13 | 2018 |
| BROWN AND MOORE'S VALUE INVARIABILISM VS DANCY's VARIABILISM G Fletcher The Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238), 162-168, 2010 | 12 | 2010 |
Tyler J. VanderWeeleJohn L. Loeb and Frances Lehman Loeb Professor of Epidemiology, Harvard University在 hsph.harvard.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
