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Guy Axtell
Guy Axtell
Professor of Philosophy
在 radford.edu 的电子邮件经过验证 - 首页
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引用次数
引用次数
年份
Recent work on virtue epistemology
G Axtell
American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1), 1-26, 1997
2331997
Just the right thickness: A defense of second-wave virtue epistemology
G Axtell, JA Carter
Philosophical papers 37 (3), 413-434, 2008
342008
Objectivity
G Axtell
John Wiley & Sons, 2016
332016
Recent work in applied virtue ethics
G Axtell, P Olson
American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3), 183-203, 2012
322012
Expanding epistemology: A responsibilist approach
G Axtell
Philosophical Papers 37 (1), 51-87, 2008
292008
In the tracks of the historicist movement: Re-assessing the Carnap-Kuhn connection
GS Axtell
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1), 119-146, 1993
251993
to Virtue Responsibilism
G Axtell
Evidentialism and its Discontents, 71, 2011
232011
Epistemic-virtue talk: The reemergence of American axiology?
G Axtell
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 172-198, 1996
221996
Comparative Dialectics: Nishida Kitarō's Logic of Place and Western Dialectical Thought
GS Axtell
Philosophy East and West, 163-184, 1991
211991
Problems of religious luck: Assessing the limits of reasonable religious disagreement
G Axtell
Lexington Books, 2020
202020
The role of the intellectual virtues in the reunification of epistemology
G Axtell
The Monist 81 (3), 488-508, 1998
201998
Recovering responsibility
G Axtell
Logos & Episteme 2 (3), 429-454, 2011
192011
Epistemic luck in light of the virtues
G Axtell
192001
Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology
G Axtell
Metaphilosophy 34 (3), 331-352, 2003
182003
Three independent factors in epistemology
G Axtell, P Olson
Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2), 89, 2009
172009
Agency ascriptions in ethics and epistemology: Or, navigating intersections, narrow and broad
G Axtell
Metaphilosophy 41 (1‐2), 73-94, 2010
152010
Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism
G Axtell
122008
Teaching James’s “The Will to Believe”
G Axtell
Teaching philosophy 24 (4), 325-345, 2001
112001
Blind man’s bluff: The basic belief apologetic as anti-skeptical stratagem
G Axtell
Philosophical studies 130 (1), 131-152, 2006
102006
Thinking twice about virtue and vice: Philosophical situationism and the vicious minds hypothesis
G Axtell
Logos & Episteme 8 (1), 7-39, 2017
92017
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