Recent work on virtue epistemology G Axtell American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1), 1-26, 1997 | 233 | 1997 |
Just the right thickness: A defense of second-wave virtue epistemology G Axtell, JA Carter Philosophical papers 37 (3), 413-434, 2008 | 34 | 2008 |
Objectivity G Axtell John Wiley & Sons, 2016 | 33 | 2016 |
Recent work in applied virtue ethics G Axtell, P Olson American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3), 183-203, 2012 | 32 | 2012 |
Expanding epistemology: A responsibilist approach G Axtell Philosophical Papers 37 (1), 51-87, 2008 | 29 | 2008 |
In the tracks of the historicist movement: Re-assessing the Carnap-Kuhn connection GS Axtell Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1), 119-146, 1993 | 25 | 1993 |
to Virtue Responsibilism G Axtell Evidentialism and its Discontents, 71, 2011 | 23 | 2011 |
Epistemic-virtue talk: The reemergence of American axiology? G Axtell The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 172-198, 1996 | 22 | 1996 |
Comparative Dialectics: Nishida Kitarō's Logic of Place and Western Dialectical Thought GS Axtell Philosophy East and West, 163-184, 1991 | 21 | 1991 |
Problems of religious luck: Assessing the limits of reasonable religious disagreement G Axtell Lexington Books, 2020 | 20 | 2020 |
The role of the intellectual virtues in the reunification of epistemology G Axtell The Monist 81 (3), 488-508, 1998 | 20 | 1998 |
Recovering responsibility G Axtell Logos & Episteme 2 (3), 429-454, 2011 | 19 | 2011 |
Epistemic luck in light of the virtues G Axtell | 19 | 2001 |
Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology G Axtell Metaphilosophy 34 (3), 331-352, 2003 | 18 | 2003 |
Three independent factors in epistemology G Axtell, P Olson Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2), 89, 2009 | 17 | 2009 |
Agency ascriptions in ethics and epistemology: Or, navigating intersections, narrow and broad G Axtell Metaphilosophy 41 (1‐2), 73-94, 2010 | 15 | 2010 |
Virtue‐Theoretic Responses to Skepticism G Axtell | 12 | 2008 |
Teaching James’s “The Will to Believe” G Axtell Teaching philosophy 24 (4), 325-345, 2001 | 11 | 2001 |
Blind man’s bluff: The basic belief apologetic as anti-skeptical stratagem G Axtell Philosophical studies 130 (1), 131-152, 2006 | 10 | 2006 |
Thinking twice about virtue and vice: Philosophical situationism and the vicious minds hypothesis G Axtell Logos & Episteme 8 (1), 7-39, 2017 | 9 | 2017 |