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Sarah McGrath
Sarah McGrath
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University
在 princeton.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
标题
引用次数
引用次数
年份
Causation by omission: A dilemma
S McGrath
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the …, 2005
2712005
Moral disagreement and moral expertise
S McGrath
Oxford studies in metaethics 3 (87), 87-108, 2008
2302008
Skepticism about moral expertise as a puzzle for moral realism
S McGrath
The Journal of Philosophy 108 (3), 111-137, 2011
2142011
The puzzle of pure moral deference
S McGrath
Philosophical Perspectives 23, 321-344, 2009
1672009
Is reflective equilibrium enough?
T Kelly, S McGrath
Philosophical perspectives 24, 325-359, 2010
1502010
Moral knowledge by perception
S McGrath
Philosophical perspectives 18, 209-228, 2004
1182004
Relax? Don’t do it! Why moral realism won’t come cheap
S McGrath
Oxford studies in metaethics 9 (2014), 186-214, 2014
542014
Moral knowledge
S McGrath
Oxford University Press, 2019
512019
Moral realism without convergence
S McGrath
Philosophical Topics, 59-90, 2010
432010
Moral knowledge and experience
S McGrath
Oxford studies in metaethics 6, 107-127, 2011
292011
Causation and the making/allowing distinction
S McGrath
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the …, 2003
262003
Moral perception and its rivals
S McGrath
Evaluative perception, 161-182, 2018
242018
Normative ethics, conversion, and pictures as tools of moral persuasion
S McGrath
212011
Are There Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?
T Kelly, S McGrath
Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen …, 2014
132014
Organ procurement, altruism, and autonomy
S Mcgrath
J. Value Inquiry 40, 297, 2006
102006
Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong
S McGrath
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics, 104-126, 2015
92015
Reply to King
S Mcgrath
Journal of Philosophical Research 36, 235, 2011
92011
The metaethics of gender
S McGrath, R Shafer-Landau
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16 16, 27, 2021
52021
PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY AND LEVELS OF GENERALITY.
S McGrath
Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1), 2019
32019
Soames and Moore on method in ethics and epistemology
S McGrath, T Kelly
Philosophical Studies 172, 1661-1670, 2015
32015
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