| Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition W Zhong Columbia University, 2018 | 112* | 2018 |
| Auctions with limited commitment Q Liu, K Mierendorff, X Shi, W Zhong American Economic Review 109 (3), 876-910, 2019 | 67 | 2019 |
| The cost of optimally-acquired information AW Bloedel, W Zhong Unpublished Manuscript, November, 2020 | 65 | 2020 |
| Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection N Kartik, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02994, 2023 | 26 | 2023 |
| Statistical discrimination in ratings-guided markets YK Che, K Kim, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.11531, 2020 | 16 | 2020 |
| Robustly-optimal mechanism for selling multiple goods YK Che, W Zhong Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 314-315, 2021 | 12 | 2021 |
| Information design possibility set W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05752, 2018 | 10 | 2018 |
| Selling Information W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.06770, 2016 | 7* | 2016 |
| Engagement maximization B Hébert, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.00685, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
| Order statistics of large samples: theory and an application to robust auction design W He, J Li, W Zhong Technical report, Mimeo, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Two-sided discrimination in an entrepreneurial financing setting: Experimental and theoretical evidence J Feng, Y Zhang, W Zhong, O Gefen Available at SSRN 4065009, 2022 | 3 | 2022 |
| Time preference and information acquisition W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.05120, 2018 | 3 | 2018 |
| Persuasion and Optimal Stopping A Koh, S Sanguanmoo, W Zhong arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.12278, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Rank-Guaranteed Auctions W He, J Li, W Zhong | | 2024 |
| Information Acquisition and Time-Risk Preference D Chen, W Zhong | | 2024 |
| Discrimination in Two-sided Matching Market: Experimental and Theoretical Evidence in Entrepreneurial Finance J Feng, O Gefen, Y Zhang, W Zhong | | 2024 |
| Essays on information acquisition W Zhong Columbia University, 2019 | | 2019 |
Qingmin LiuColumbia University在 columbia.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
