| Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions D Murray, E Nahmias Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2), 434-467, 2014 | 179 | 2014 |
| Experimental philosophy on free will: An error theory for incompatibilist intuitions E Nahmias, D Murray New waves in philosophy of action, 189-216, 2010 | 142 | 2010 |
| Judgment before principle: engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission F Cushman, D Murray, S Gordon-McKeon, S Wharton, JD Greene Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7 (8), 888-895, 2012 | 98 | 2012 |
| God knows (but does God believe?) D Murray, J Sytsma, J Livengood Philosophical studies 166, 83-107, 2013 | 80 | 2013 |
| Effects of manipulation on attributions of causation, free will, and moral responsibility D Murray, T Lombrozo Cognitive science 41 (2), 447-481, 2017 | 55 | 2017 |
| Situationism, going mental, and modal akrasia D Murray Philosophical Studies 172, 711-736, 2015 | 11 | 2015 |
| Risk and motivation: When the will is required to determine what to do D Murray, L Buchak Philosophers' Imprint 19, 2019 | 8 | 2019 |
| Experiments on Causal Exclusion T Blanchard, D Murray, T Lombrozo Mind & Language 37 (5), 1067-1089, 2021 | 7 | 2021 |
| Maggots are delicious, sunsets hideous: false, or do you just disagree? Data on truth relativism about judgments of personal taste and aesthetics D Murray Oxford Studies im Experimental Philosophy 3, 64-96, 2020 | | 2020 |
| Alfred Mele, Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will D Murray | | 2018 |
| Hijacking Reason: The Moral Ecology of Implicit Bias D Murray University of California, Berkeley, 2017 | | 2017 |
| When it’s wrong not to act: How the brain processes harmful omissions F Cushman, S Gordon-McKeon, D Murray, S Wharton, J Greene | | |
Eddy NahmiasGeorgia State University在 gsu.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
