| A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, RM Sheremeta Experimental Economics 18, 609-669, 2015 | 931 | 2015 |
| Inventor moral hazard in university licensing: The role of contracts E Dechenaux, J Thursby, M Thursby Research policy 40 (1), 94-104, 2011 | 117 | 2011 |
| Appropriability and commercialization: Evidence from MIT inventions E Dechenaux, B Goldfarb, S Shane, M Thursby Management Science 54 (5), 893-906, 2008 | 116 | 2008 |
| Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts E Dechenaux, M Thursby, J Thursby International Journal of Industrial Organization 27 (1), 80-91, 2009 | 109 | 2009 |
| Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions E Dechenaux, D Kovenock The RAND Journal of Economics 38 (4), 1044-1069, 2007 | 55 | 2007 |
| Appropriability and the timing of innovation: Evidence from MIT inventions E Dechenaux, B Goldfarb, S Shane, MC Thursby National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003 | 50 | 2003 |
| Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox E Dechenaux, SD Mago, L Razzolini Experimental economics 17 (3), 461-487, 2014 | 32 | 2014 |
| Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, V Lugovskyy Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61 (2), 276-283, 2006 | 27 | 2006 |
| Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis S Datta Mago, E Dechenaux Experimental Economics 12, 289-317, 2009 | 26 | 2009 |
| Shirking, sharing risk, and shelving: the role of university license contracts MC Thursby, J Thursby, E Dechenaux National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005 | 17 | 2005 |
| Announced vs. surprise inspections with tipping-off E Dechenaux, A Samuel European Journal of Political Economy 34, 167-183, 2014 | 16 | 2014 |
| Pre‐emptive corruption, hold‐up and repeated interactions E Dechenaux, A Samuel Economica 79 (314), 258-283, 2012 | 16 | 2012 |
| Auction-theoretic approach to modeling legal systems: An experimental analysis E Dechenaux, M Mancini Available at SSRN 741844, 2008 | 14 | 2008 |
| Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames E Dechenaux, D Kovenock Purdue University Economics Working Paper 1164, 2003 | 14 | 2003 |
| Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames E Dechenaux, D Kovenock Economic Theory 47, 29-74, 2011 | 13 | 2011 |
| A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence” E Dechenaux, D Kovenock, V Lugovskyy Purdue University Economics Working Papers, 2003 | 11 | 2003 |
| Optimal fines under announced and surprise inspections E Dechenaux, A Samuel Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (5), 786-801, 2016 | 9 | 2016 |
| Ill‐Defined versus Precise Pre‐Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma S Chakravarty, E Dechenaux, J Roy Southern Economic Journal 77 (2), 351-368, 2010 | 7 | 2010 |
| A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments RM Sheremeta, E Dechenaux, D Kovenock Economic Science Institute Working Paper, 2012 | 6 | 2012 |
| Bargaining in a closed-loop supply chain with consumer returns Y Tanai, E Dechenaux, EB Patuwo, AL Guiffrida International Journal of Operational Research 41 (2), 168-195, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
Dan KovenockProfessor of Economics, Chapman University在 chapman.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
