| Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism A Feltz, ET Cokely Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1), 342-350, 2009 | 209 | 2009 |
| Skilled decision theory: From intelligence to numeracy and expertise. ET Cokely, A Feltz, S Ghazal, JN Allan, D Petrova, R Garcia-Retamero Cambridge University Press, 2018 | 195* | 2018 |
| The actor–observer bias and moral intuitions: Adding fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s fire T Nadelhoffer, A Feltz Neuroethics 1, 133-144, 2008 | 176 | 2008 |
| Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense E Schulz, ET Cokely, A Feltz Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4), 1722-1731, 2011 | 165 | 2011 |
| Do you know more when it matters less? A Feltz, C Zarpentine Philosophical psychology 23 (5), 683-706, 2010 | 138 | 2010 |
| Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry ET Cokely, A Feltz Journal of Research in Personality 43 (1), 18-24, 2009 | 106 | 2009 |
| Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board A Feltz, ET Cokely, T Nadelhoffer Mind & Language 24 (1), 1-23, 2009 | 100 | 2009 |
| Philosophical temperament J Livengood, J Sytsma, A Feltz, R Scheines, E Machery Philosophical Psychology 23 (3), 313-330, 2010 | 93 | 2010 |
| The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual differences in moral judgments and folk intuitions A Feltz, ET Cokely Proceedings of the 30th annual conference of the cognitive science society …, 2008 | 91 | 2008 |
| The Knobe effect: A brief overview A Feltz The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 265-277, 2007 | 79 | 2007 |
| The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis A Feltz, J May Cognition 166, 314-327, 2017 | 76 | 2017 |
| Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis A Feltz, F Cova Consciousness and cognition 30, 234-246, 2014 | 74 | 2014 |
| The philosophical personality argument A Feltz, ET Cokely Philosophical Studies 161, 227-246, 2012 | 64 | 2012 |
| An anomaly in intentional action ascription: More evidence of folk diversity A Feltz, ET Cokely Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 29 (29), 2007 | 64 | 2007 |
| Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition ET Cokely, A Feltz Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1), 356-358, 2009 | 58 | 2009 |
| Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will A Feltz Consciousness and cognition 22 (1), 53-63, 2013 | 52 | 2013 |
| Experimental philosophical bioethics BD Earp, J Demaree-Cotton, M Dunn, V Dranseika, JAC Everett, A Feltz, ... AJOB Empirical Bioethics 11 (1), 30-33, 2020 | 50 | 2020 |
| An error theory for compatibilist intuitions A Feltz, M Millan Philosophical Psychology 28 (4), 529-555, 2015 | 45 | 2015 |
| Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases JS Miller, A Feltz Consciousness and cognition 20 (2), 401-414, 2011 | 40 | 2011 |
| Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects A Feltz, ET Cokely Philosophical Psychology 24 (3), 343-355, 2011 | 38 | 2011 |
Edward T. CokelyPresidential Research Professor & Professor of Psychology, University of Oklahoma在 ou.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
Edward T. CokelyPresidential Research Professor & Professor of Psychology, University of Oklahoma在 ou.edu 的电子邮件经过验证