受强制性开放获取政策约束的文章 - David Knudsen Levine了解详情
可在其他位置公开访问的文章：31 篇
Self-control, social preferences and the effect of delayed payments
A Dreber, D Fudenberg, DK Levine, DG Rand
Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments (February 17, 2016), 2016
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
Voter turnout with peer punishment
DK Levine, A Mattozzi
American Economic Review 110 (10), 3298-3314, 2020
强制性开放获取政策： European Commission
Anti-malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies
DK Levine, S Modica
Research in Economics 67 (4), 289-306, 2013
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Peer discipline and incentives within groups
DK Levine, S Modica
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 123, 19-30, 2016
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation, Government of Italy
Entertaining Malthus: Bread, circuses, and economic growth
R Dutta, DK Levine, NW Papageorge, L Wu
Economic Inquiry 56 (1), 358-380, 2018
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
DK Levine, S Modica
Theoretical Economics 11 (1), 89-131, 2016
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation, Government of Italy
Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations
DK Levine, S Modica
European Journal of Political Economy 49, 71-83, 2017
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation, Government of Italy
The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization
R Dutta, DK Levine, S Modica
Journal of Public Economic Theory 23 (5), 858-894, 2021
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Evolution of impatience: The example of the Farmer-Sheriff game
DK Levine, S Modica, F Weinschelbaum, F Zurita
American economic journal: microeconomics 7 (3), 295-317, 2015
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy, Government of Argentina
Success in contests
DK Levine, A Mattozzi
Economic Theory 73 (2), 595-624, 2022
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
The reputation trap
DK Levine
Econometrica 89 (6), 2659-2678, 2021
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Collusion constrained equilibrium
R Dutta, DK Levine, S Modica
Theoretical Economics 13 (1), 307-340, 2018
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation, Government of Italy
Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
JI Block, DK Levine
International journal of game theory 45, 971-984, 2016
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
Interventions with sticky social norms: A critique
R Dutta, DK Levine, S Modica
Journal of the European Economic Association 20 (1), 39-78, 2022
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Learning in games and the interpretation of natural experiments
D Fudenberg, DK Levine
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (3), 353-377, 2022
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
Trade associations: why not cartels?
DK Levine, A Mattozzi, S Modica
International economic review 62 (1), 47-64, 2021
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters
R Dutta, DK Levine, S Modica
Journal of economic theory 177, 101-125, 2018
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation, Government of Italy
Social Mechanisms and Political Economy: When Lobbyists Succeed, Pollsters Fail and Populists Win
DK Levine, A Mattozzi, S Modica
Levine's Working Paper Archive, 2022
强制性开放获取政策： Government of Italy
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 1
JI Block, D Fudenberg, DK Levine
Theoretical Economics 14 (1), 135-172, 2019
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization
R Corrao, D Fudenberg, D Levine
mimeo EUI, 2022
强制性开放获取政策： US National Science Foundation
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