| Certifiable pre‐play communication: Full disclosure J Hagenbach, F Koessler, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 82 (3), 1093-1131, 2014 | 137 | 2014 |
| Altruism in networks R Bourlès, Y Bramoullé, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 85 (2), 675-689, 2017 | 128 | 2017 |
| Test design under falsification E Perez‐Richet, V Skreta Econometrica 90 (3), 1109-1142, 2022 | 96* | 2022 |
| Interim bayesian persuasion: First steps E Perez-Richet American Economic Review 104 (5), 469-474, 2014 | 96 | 2014 |
| Communication with Evidence in the Lab J Hagenbach, E Perez-Richet Games and Economic Behavior 112, 139-165, 2018 | 46 | 2018 |
| Complicating to persuade E Perez-Richet, D Prady Available at SSRN 1868066, 2011 | 31 | 2011 |
| Altruism and risk sharing in networks R Bourlès, Y Bramoullé, E Perez-Richet Journal of the European Economic Association 19 (3), 1488-1521, 2021 | 26 | 2021 |
| Evidence reading mechanisms F Koessler, E Perez-Richet Social Choice and Welfare, 1-23, 2019 | 22* | 2019 |
| Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues R Godefroy, E Perez‐Richet Econometrica 81 (1), 221-253, 2013 | 15 | 2013 |
| Competing with equivocal information E Perez-Richet | 11 | 2012 |
| Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms E Perez-Richet, V Skreta Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2023 | 9 | 2023 |
| A proof of Blackwell’s theorem E Perez-Richet Working Paper, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
| A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms E Perez-Richet Economics Letters 110 (1), 15-17, 2011 | 7 | 2011 |
| Information design with agency J Bizzotto, E Perez-Richet, A Vigier CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13868, 2019 | 5* | 2019 |
| Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives V Augias, E Perez-Richet arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.11805, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
| Score-based mechanisms E Perez-Richet, V Skreta arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.08031, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Communication via Third Parties J Bizzotto, E Perez-Richet, A Vigier Available at SSRN 3530804, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
Frederic KOESSLERSenior Researcher at CNRS, and Professor at Paris School of Economics在 pse.ens.fr 的电子邮件经过验证
