| Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis R Fahlenbrach, RM Stulz Journal of financial economics 99 (1), 11-26, 2011 | 1628 | 2011 |
| Derivatives markets RL McDonald Pearson, 2013 | 887 | 2013 |
| Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance R Fahlenbrach Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (2), 439-466, 2009 | 882* | 2009 |
| Large shareholders and corporate policies H Cronqvist, R Fahlenbrach The Review of Financial Studies 22 (10), 3941-3976, 2008 | 657 | 2008 |
| How valuable is financial flexibility when revenue stops? Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis R Fahlenbrach, K Rageth, RM Stulz The Review of Financial Studies 34 (11), 5474-5521, 2021 | 653 | 2021 |
| This time is the same: Using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis R Fahlenbrach, R Prilmeier, RM Stulz The Journal of Finance 67 (6), 2139-2185, 2012 | 619 | 2012 |
| Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors? R Fahlenbrach, A Low, RM Stulz Journal of Financial Economics 97 (1), 12-32, 2010 | 539 | 2010 |
| Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value? C Schmidt, R Fahlenbrach Journal of financial economics 124 (2), 285-306, 2017 | 450 | 2017 |
| Shareholder rights, boards, and CEO compensation R Fahlenbrach Review of Finance 13 (1), 81-113, 2009 | 421 | 2009 |
| Large blocks of stock: Prevalence, size, and measurement J Dlugosz, R Fahlenbrach, P Gompers, A Metrick Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (3), 594-618, 2006 | 397 | 2006 |
| Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value R Fahlenbrach, RM Stulz Journal of Financial Economics 92 (3), 342-361, 2009 | 371 | 2009 |
| Estimating the effects of large shareholders using a geographic instrument B Becker, H Cronqvist, R Fahlenbrach Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (4), 907-942, 2011 | 236 | 2011 |
| Institutional investors and mutual fund governance: Evidence from retail–institutional fund twins RB Evans, R Fahlenbrach The Review of Financial Studies 25 (12), 3530-3571, 2012 | 208 | 2012 |
| Why does fast loan growth predict poor performance for banks? R Fahlenbrach, R Prilmeier, RM Stulz The Review of Financial Studies 31 (3), 1014-1063, 2018 | 166 | 2018 |
| Do independent director departures predict future bad events? R Fahlenbrach, A Low, RM Stulz The Review of Financial Studies 30 (7), 2313-2358, 2017 | 128 | 2017 |
| Former CEO directors: lingering CEOs or valuable resources? R Fahlenbrach, BA Minton, CH Pan The Review of Financial Studies 24 (10), 3486-3518, 2011 | 111 | 2011 |
| ICO investors R Fahlenbrach, M Frattaroli Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 35 (1), 1-59, 2021 | 110 | 2021 |
| The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed? R Fahlenbrach, A Low, RM Stulz National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010 | 103 | 2010 |
| Why don't all banks practice regulatory arbitrage? Evidence from usage of trust-preferred securities NM Boyson, R Fahlenbrach, RM Stulz The Review of Financial Studies 29 (7), 1821-1859, 2016 | 95 | 2016 |
| CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it? H Cronqvist, R Fahlenbrach Journal of Financial Economics 108 (3), 659-674, 2013 | 92 | 2013 |
Henrik CronqvistChapman University Argyros College of Business and Economics在 chapman.edu 的电子邮件经过验证
