Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency
P Engel - Philosophical explorations, 2009 - Taylor & Francis
Philosophical explorations, 2009•Taylor & Francis
This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the
ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian'views which lead to a distinctive
conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be
held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without
being epistemic agents.
ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian'views which lead to a distinctive
conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be
held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without
being epistemic agents.
This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various ‘Kantian’ views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
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