When India became independent in 1947 and chose democracy based on universal franchise as a system of governance, it was thought to be a brave choice but one that would not last long. As the country went to the polls for the second time in 1957, a commentator on Indian politics remarked that" the odds are wholly against the survival of freedom... in fact, the issue is whether any Indian state can survive at all."'More than thirty years have gone by since that remark was made, and while the test of survival probably has been passed, the processes of survival have not been easy. Indeed, the testing has become more and more stringent. There is a rise in social conflict, the economy does not show an adequate rate of growth, and democratic institutions, now being cited as reasons for the inability to cope with the social and economic problems, are losing their democratic character and are unable to stem the tide of violence in society. This article attempts to examine some of these issues and particularly focuses attention on the processes and the institu-tions by which the Indian state has expanded its capacity to use coercive power.

The State and Society Coercion, accepted as the defining characteristic of the state, has a dual character. It guarantees the reproduction of domination and order and suppresses challenges to state authority. In the course of time, it helps to create conditions that allow for voluntary obedience to laws and their legitimation. Yet, coercion also undermines legitimacy. Continuous use of force to suppress dissent, resolve social conflicts, and maintain order may lead to the erosion of legitimacy and undermine the capacity of the state to rule. Thus, the state stands in a paradoxical situation regarding the use of