… epistemic condition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or mental condition). The first condition
has to do with whether the agent … with whether the agent’s epistemic or cognitive state was …

… belief, an individual must fulfill her epistemic obligations by (or in the … obligation an epistemic
obligation is not simply that it concerns beliefs – after all, you might have a moral obligation …

… of epistemically sensible collective epistemic agents … epistemic subjects can qualify as
epistemic agents on the basis of being able to collectively exhibit an appropriate form of epistemic …

… responsible for her beliefs, some epistemologists think that we can model epistemic
responsibility, ie, responsibility for a belief, along the lines of moral responsibility, ie, responsibility …

… epistemic inclusions may be just as pernicious as epistemic … epistemic agents can be
included in epistemic systems in a manner that is epistemically exploitative—extracting epistemic …

… epistemic agency, we argue that focusing on whether students in NGSS classrooms do or do
not have agency is … to perceive and act with the agency to contribute to knowledge building. …

… , must be distinguished from individualistic agency, which must also be differentiated in …
epistemic. We argue that collective agency in legal systems differs from individual agency not …

… groups and deflate the critical force of their epistemic resources. Following Davis (2018) …
of epistemic responsibility involved in the epistemic appropriation of the resistant epistemic …

… prompted me to write a book called Epistemic Responsibility in the 1980s, after completing
… did not lead directly into thoughts about epistemic responsibility since the concept was not …

… These remarks on epistemic injustice are drawn from an account of the hermeneutics of
agency. I consider the epistemic injustice implicated in assertions about the agential deficiencies …