We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply
about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be …

The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once
again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of …

A rational person doesn't believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to
believe. How wide are these limits? That's the main question that interests me here. But a …

When we evaluate our beliefs and our reasonings as justified or unjustified, as good or bad,
or as rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the term, normative judgments …

The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our
habits of belief-formation, belief-maintenance, and belief-relinquishment. Is it ever or always …

This paper is about the boundaries of epistemic normativity. I argue we can understand
these better by thinking about which mental states are competitor's in rationality's …

Historically, the main concern in epistemology has been to explain how we are justified in
holding the various kinds of beliefs we have about the world. When we ask whether a belief …

What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to
do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we …

Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they
are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly …

When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is
faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of …