Catherine Elgin has recently offered compatibility with autonomy as a plausible criterion for
the epistemic virtues. This approach mixes elements of Kantianism with virtue theory. Sasha …

In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of
knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of …

If description of mental processes and evaluation of agents and their beliefs are rightly to be
considered as complementary concerns on any plausible construal of the epistemological …

This paper argues for a permissivism of personal rationality, a rationality concerning the
epistemic evaluation of persons. I work from the perspective of virtue epistemology where …

Recent epistemology has been notable for an emphasis, or a variety of emphases, upon the
social dimension of knowledge. This has provided a corrective to the heavily individualist …

The bounds of agency—of our capacities to act in the world—are re vealed in our
commitments. We tend to think that our moral commitments, for example, emerge from our …

Epistemic agents are ineluctably interdependent. We are nodes in epistemic networks,
supporting and supported by others. Via testimony we convey and glean information. We …

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional
knowledge (eg, Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a …

The purpose of Epistemic Authority1 is to defend the rationality of belief on authority from the
modern assumption that the ultimate authority over the self is the self. More specifically, the …

The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our
intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and …