Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality, and Law approaches a complex set of issues with analytical rigour, clarity, and a respectful directness. It extensively buries poor argumentation and enlivens new lines of thoughts and inquiry. Whilst it does not (and need not)‘advance any novel theory about the conditions for personhood or about when persons begin’, 1 the book refocuses the abortion debate, reshapes the wider philosophical concepts, and does offer new perspectives and angles of argumentation. As the title suggests, Arguments about Abortion contains a series of arguments that are unified under the umbrella of being ‘about abortion’. The arguments are wide-ranging, covering philosophical methodology, the moral status of the pre-born, newly born, the comatose, and the cognitively impaired, as well as theories of regulation, and even conscientious objection. It is a book for foxes. And, unfortunately, I am a hedgehog. So I only wish to focus on two closely related ideas. These are ideas that I take to underlie Greasley’s more constructive aspects of her book. The first is Greasley’s ‘personhood argument’. Contrary to Dworkin’s contention that the question of whether a foetus is a person is ultimately a matter of ‘primitive conviction’, where ‘no biological fact’nor ‘crushing moral analogy’can ‘dispose of the matter’, 2 Greasley seeks to keep the concept of the person as both intelligible and relevant to the abortion debate. The second is ‘the human embodiment argument’, where Greasley seeks to vindicate the ‘intuition that later abortion is more morally serious than early abortion’by ‘thinking about the moral respect we have to reason to demonstrate for human embodiment’. 3 This narrow focus does not do justice to the impressively broad scope of the book and the value of the wider enterprise that it represents. Nonetheless, in this review, I try to see if I can force Greasley’s constructive thesis into a dilemma, of sorts. I will suggest here that, either she ought to abandon the personhood thesis, and accept that we ought to assess the moral status of the foetus without reference to the concept of the person, or the personhood thesis forces her to recognise the gap in her embodiment argument the between actual capacities of the embodied person and latent capacities of the embodied foetus. This dilemma follows from two critical observations that are developed here. The first is that Greasley need not commit to applying the concept of the person in order to avoid Dworkin’s deflationary argument. The second is that, whilst I agree that human embodiment has moral import, I disagree that human embodiment can have independent moral significance prior to the exercise of psychological and emotional capacities, in the way that Greasley suggests that it does.