Veganism is commonly described as the attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the exploitation and consumption of animals and animal products. While some people choose the plant-based diet associated with veganism for health or other self-interested reasons, the majority of philosophical work on the topic has been devoted to discussion of the ethical justification of veganism (ie, to ‘ethical veganism’). Some argue that it is a moral imperative if we take the rights or interests of animals seriously (eg, Francione & Charlton, 2013; Mason & Singer, 1980). Others regard it as a necessity if we are to live up to our duties to live as sustainably as possible (Fox, 2000), or to minimize public health risks (Melina et al., 2016; Vyas, 2019; Walker et al., 2005). Still others hold that it is supported by religious and spiritual reasons (Kemmerer, 2012). These justifications are, of course, not mutually exclusive.

And yet, others have questioned whether moral concern for animals really does entail a vegan diet (Davis, 2003 (on field deaths), but cf. Fischer & Lamey, 2018; Fischer, 2019 (on backyard chickens); Lamey, 2019, chap. 9, and Reese, 2018 (on cultured meat); or Milburn, 2015 (on pet food)). Still others have questioned the link between veganism and sustainability (Mackenzie, 2020). Furthermore, a small minority dismiss veganism because they reject the idea of our having moral duties to animals (Hsiao, 2017); while others accept moral duties to animals, but regard veganism as either too demanding (Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2014), as having certain harmful consequences in its own right (Mackenzie, 2020), not leading causally to the desired effects (Harris & Galvin, 2012; Kahn, 2021) or, in turn, leading to moral overreach (Mills, 2019). We argue that while these moral debates are important, they miss out a crucial feature of veganism: its political dimension. By referring to veganism as ‘political’we primarily mean two