CEO compensation, regulation, and risk in banks: Theory and evidence from the financial crisis
International Journal of Central Banking, 2015 - boa.unimib.it
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation, and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
[PDF][PDF] CEO Compensation, Regulation and Risk in Banks: Theory and Evidence from the Financial Crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - researchgate.net
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to …
[PDF][PDF] CEO compensation, regulation, and risk in banks: theory and evidence from the financial crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - 40th issue (June 2015) of the International Journal of …, 2018 - ijcb.org
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation, and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
CEO compensation, regulation, and risk in banks: Theory and evidence from the financial crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CENTRAL …, 2015 - iris.unina.it
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to …
CEO Compensation, Regulation, and Risk in Banks: Theory and Evidence from the Financial Crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - International Journal of Central Banking, 2015 - econpapers.repec.org
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation, and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
CEO Compensation, Regulation, and Risk in Banks: Theory and Evidence from the Financial Crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - International Journal of Central Banking, 2015 - ideas.repec.org
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation, and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
CEO compensation, regulation, and risk in banks: theory and evidence from the financial crisis
V Cerasi, T Oliviero - 40th issue (June 2015) of the International Journal of …, 2018 - ijcb.org
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation, and
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …
risk in banks. We develop a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects that …