On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - Proceedings of the …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - arXiv e …, 2021 - ui.adsabs.harvard.edu
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos, A Hollender… - SIAM Journal on …, 2023 - SIAM
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
[PDF][PDF] On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2021 - plazos.me
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the rst-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - SIAM Journal on …, 2023 - eprints.gla.ac.uk
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
[PDF][PDF] ON THE COMPLEXITY OF EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION IN
FP AUCTIONS - … of the 22nd ACM Conference on …, 2021 - yiannisgiannakopoulos.com
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes--Nash equilibrium in the firstprice
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - SIAM Journal on …, 2023 - research.ed.ac.uk
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the rst-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
[引用][C] On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos, A Hollender… - CoRR, 2021 - mediatum.ub.tum.de
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On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - SIAM Journal on …, 2023 - ora.ox.ac.uk
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the first-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
[PDF][PDF] On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos, A Hollender… - pure.ed.ac.uk
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the rst-price
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …
auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when …