Algebraic attacks on summation generators
DH Lee, J Kim, J Hong, JW Han, D Moon - International Workshop on Fast …, 2004 - Springer
DH Lee, J Kim, J Hong, JW Han, D Moon
International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, 2004•SpringerWe apply the algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with memories to the summation
generator. For a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, an algebraic equation relating the
key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to
^⌈\log_2n⌉ using⌈ log 2 n⌉+ 1 consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the
upper bound given by previous general results. We also show that the techniques of 6, 2 can
be applied to summation generators using 2 k LFSRs to reduce the effective degree of the …
generator. For a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, an algebraic equation relating the
key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to
^⌈\log_2n⌉ using⌈ log 2 n⌉+ 1 consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the
upper bound given by previous general results. We also show that the techniques of 6, 2 can
be applied to summation generators using 2 k LFSRs to reduce the effective degree of the …
Abstract
We apply the algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with memories to the summation generator. For a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, an algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to using ⌈log2 n ⌉ + 1 consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the upper bound given by previous general results. We also show that the techniques of [6,2] can be applied to summation generators using 2 k LFSRs to reduce the effective degree of the algebraic equation.
Springer
以上显示的是最相近的搜索结果。 查看全部搜索结果