Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle
2011•papers.ssrn.com
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which
each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the
restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only
focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its
power in games with a single agent.
each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the
restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only
focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its
power in games with a single agent.
Abstract
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria. However, the traditional Revelation Principle retains its power in games with a single agent.
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