Distracted analysts and earnings management
This study examines whether firms covered by distracted analysts manage their earnings
more intensively. We construct a firm-level measure of analyst distraction based on
exogenous attention-grabbing events and find that analyst distraction is positively
associated with earnings management. Our findings demonstrate that limited attention from
analysts can negatively affect corporate financial reporting quality.
more intensively. We construct a firm-level measure of analyst distraction based on
exogenous attention-grabbing events and find that analyst distraction is positively
associated with earnings management. Our findings demonstrate that limited attention from
analysts can negatively affect corporate financial reporting quality.
Abstract
This study examines whether firms covered by distracted analysts manage their earnings more intensively. We construct a firm-level measure of analyst distraction based on exogenous attention-grabbing events and find that analyst distraction is positively associated with earnings management. Our findings demonstrate that limited attention from analysts can negatively affect corporate financial reporting quality.
Elsevier
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