Abstract Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted
redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions
using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection
into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994–2001:
candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both
they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin …

Abstract Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted
redistribution and lower politicians' rents than proportional representation. We test these
predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which
allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level
data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by
exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates …