Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play
J Brandts, WB MacLeod - Games and Economic Behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which
subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the
self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that
perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs
influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that
subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of …
subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the
self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that
perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs
influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that
subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of …
[引用][C] Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play
WB Macleod, J Brandts - 1992 - econpapers.repec.org
EconPapers: Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play …
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play … Keywords:
economic equilibrium; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers) …
Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play … Keywords:
economic equilibrium; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers) …
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