On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models
J Oechssler, F Riedel - Journal of Economic Theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS,
CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology
with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We
propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous
concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in
doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72.
CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology
with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We
propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous
concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in
doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72.
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