abstract The initial public offering (IPO) of a new venture's stock often results in significant
changes to the firm's ownership structure. Because firm owners (principals) often have
heterogeneous interests, conflicts can arise among the principals. While governance
mechanisms are often effective in limiting agency problems, we suggest that principals can
also attempt to use governance mechanisms to their own advantage in IPO settings.
Specifically, when principal–principal conflict exists, powerful principals may exert control …

 The initial public offering (IPO) of a new venture's stock often results in
significant changes to the firm's ownership structure. Because firm owners (principals) often
have heterogeneous interests, conflicts can arise among the principals. While governance
mechanisms are often effective in limiting agency problems, we suggest that principals can
also attempt to use governance mechanisms to their own advantage in IPO settings.
Specifically, when principal–principal conflict exists, powerful principals may exert control …