The automatic nature of motivated belief updating

A Kappes, T Sharot - Behavioural Public Policy, 2019 - cambridge.org
People's risk estimates often do not align with the evidence available to them. In particular,
people tend to discount bad news (such as evidence suggesting their risk of being involved
in a car accident is higher than they thought) as compared to good news (evidence
suggesting it is lower)–this is known as the belief update bias. It has been assumed that
individuals use motivated reasoning to rationalise away unwanted evidence (eg,“I am a safe
driver, thus these statistics do not apply to me”). However, whether reasoning is required to …

[引用][C] The automatic nature of motivated belief updating. Behavioural Public Policy, 3 (1), 87–103

A Kappes, T Sharot - 2017
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