Time-sensitive and sybil-proof incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing via social network

L Jiang, X Niu, J Xu, Y Wang, Y Wu, L Xu - IEEE Access, 2018 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
L Jiang, X Niu, J Xu, Y Wang, Y Wu, L Xu
IEEE Access, 2018ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has become a popular and promising paradigm in various
sensing applications in urban scenarios. In recent years, some social network-based MCS
systems, which utilizing the social relationship to recruit participants or perform sensing
tasks, have been proposed. However, none of them have taken into consideration both the
time-sensitive and Sybil-proofness, which are the two key problems for the MCS systems in
the social network context. We present two social network-based MCS system models, and …
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has become a popular and promising paradigm in various sensing applications in urban scenarios. In recent years, some social network-based MCS systems, which utilizing the social relationship to recruit participants or perform sensing tasks, have been proposed. However, none of them have taken into consideration both the time-sensitive and Sybil-proofness, which are the two key problems for the MCS systems in the social network context. We present two social network-based MCS system models, and formulize the Sybil attack models for each model. We design two incentive mechanisms based on reverse auction, time-sensitive and sybil-proof incentive mechanism in multi-bid model (TSSP-M), and time-sensitive and sybil-proof incentive mechanism in single-bid model (TSSP-S), for each of two system models. Through both rigorous theoretical analyses and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that TSSP-M satisfies the desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, time-sensitive, Sybil-proofness, and optimization; TSSP-S achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, time-sensitive, and Sybil-proofness.
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