When traditional essentialism fails: biological natural kinds

RA Wilson, MJ Barker, I Brigandt - Philosophical Topics, 2007 - JSTOR
Philosophical Topics, 2007JSTOR
A near consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that traditional essentialism is a
mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. Traditional essentialists hold that natural
kinds" must possess definitional essences that define them in terms of necessary and
sufficient, intrinsic, unchanging, ahistorical properties"(Boyd 1999, 146), and the near
consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that biological kinds such as species do not
possess these essences. We think that this near consensus position is correct (cf. Devitt …
A near consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that traditional essentialism is a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. Traditional essentialists hold that natural kinds" must possess definitional essences that define them in terms of necessary and sufficient, intrinsic, unchanging, ahistorical properties"(Boyd 1999, 146), and the near consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that biological kinds such as species do not possess these essences. We think that this near consensus position is correct (cf. Devitt, 2008), but that most of the constructive responses to this" death of essentialism" are unappetizing. After recounting why traditional essentialism is a mistaken view of biological kinds, we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to its rejection in the philosophy of biology and identify problems that each faces. The response that we favor, the idea that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters, is also confronted by prima facie problems, but we argue
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