In cognitive theories of the origins of religion, it is held that religious thought and behaviour are by-products of or even parasitic on more basic cognitive processes.1 Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation, genetic or cultural, even though it may occasionally help individuals and groups. In the following, I take issue with this approach. It must be emphasized, however, that the work of cognitive scientists of religion, such as Pascal Boyer and Scott Atran, has raised issues and questions that have led to useful hypotheses, experiments and insights on religion and human cognition. For instance, they agreed that the age-old assumption that religion produces morals and values is neither the only, nor the most parsimonious, hypothesis for religion. According to Boyer and Atran, humans are more or less born with, or at least quite early on have, default moral sensibilities (cf. Pyysiäinen & Hauser 2010). e evidence is strong that the origins of such sensibilities are to be found in basic social cognition.