The argument from intrinsic value: a critique

D Stretton - Bioethics, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
In his recent book Abortion and Unborn Human Life, Patrick Lee develops an argument for
foetal personhood based on intrinsic value. Lee argues that since the foetus is identical with …

Value, utility and autonomy: a moral-critical analysis of utilitarian positions on the value of prenatal life

JAM De Roubaix - 2005 - scholar.sun.ac.za
Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on
only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological …

Essential properties and the right to life: a response to Lee

D Stretton - Bioethics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT In 'The Pro‐Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence', Patrick Lee
argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the …

Fetal personhood and the sorites paradox

LF Kerckhove, S Waller - J. Value Inquiry, 1998 - HeinOnline
In the public sphere, debate about the morality of abortion continues to take place largely in
terms of fetal personhood. One reason for this is that the concept of fetal personhood can …

The moral status of a human fetus: A response to Lee

S Griffith - Christian bioethics, 2004 - academic.oup.com
It is an undeniable empirical fact that a human fetus is a member of the species homo
sapiens from the moment of conception. There is thus an important sense in which it is a …

Why Eberl is wrong. Reflections on the beginning of personhood

J Deckers - Bioethics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
In a paper published in Bioethics, Jason Eberl has argued that early embryos are not
persons and should not be granted the status possessed by them. 1 Eberl bases this …

» Potentiality and Persons: An Aristotelian Perspective «

C Megone - Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues, 2000 - books.google.com
In much of the literature on the ethics of abortion, an issue receiving considerable attention
is that of the moral status of the fetus. The question it asks is whether the fetus merits the …

The pro‐life argument from substantial identity: A defence

P Lee - Bioethics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is
wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms …

The moral status of the fœtus: a reappraisal

L Fleming - Bioethics, 1987 - pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
KIE: Fleming reappraises the school of thought that attributes a limited moral standing to the
fetus at a certain stage of development. She examines this" minimal rights position"(MRP) in …

The substance view: a critique (Part 3)

R Lovering - Bioethics, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT In my articles 'The Substance View: A Critique'and 'The Substance View: A
Critique (Part 2),'I raise objections to the substance view (naturally), a theory of intrinsic …