Different aspects and modifications of the definition of an evolutionarily stable (ES) strategy
that have been considered in the literature can be incorporated in a unifying concept which …

Evolutionary stable sets are used as an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS). They have, as sets, essentially the same properties as ordinary ESSs. Here …

As an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) evolutionarily
stable sets are introduced, ie sets of equilibrium strategies (EQS) which have much of the …

Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals
and species. The analysis of ESSs determines which, if any, combinations of behaviors …

Explanations of the observed behaviors of individuals and species often rely on evolutionary
stable strategies (ESSs). Essentially, analysis of ESSs requires a description of the …

Evolutionary game theory is extended to models of two-species interactions where fitnesses
are based on individual characteristics (strategies) rather than on a population dynamic that …

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are
two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy …

A proof is presented to show that, when fitnesses from alternative tactics within a population
depend on both their frequency and the phenotypic condition of individuals, there will be a …

The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in its original definition is
inappropriate for application to models where the pay-offs to the strategies depend on the …

A strategy in a population game is evolutionarily stable if, when adopted by large enough a
majority in the population, it becomes advantageous against any mutant strategy. It is said to …