Using a quantitative sovereign default model, we characterize constrained efficient
borrowing by a Ramsey government that commits to income-history-contingent borrowing …

This paper examines fiscal policy without commitment and the effects of conditional bailout
loans. The government relies on distortionary taxation and decides between full debt …

We examine the welfare effects of bailouts in economies exposed to sovereign default risk.
When a government of a small open economy requests a bailout from an international …

We study Markov‐perfect optimal fiscal policy in an economy with financial frictions and
sovereign default in the form endogenously determined haircuts on outstanding debt …

We study fiscal rules using a sovereign default model. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule
imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold …

This paper studies the interaction between fiscal commitment and sovereign default risk in a
model with optimal taxation and government spending. A time-inconsistency problem arises …

We determine optimal government default policies for a small open economy in which a
domestic government can borrow internationally by issuing non-contingent debt contracts …

Recurrent concerns over debt sustainability in emerging and developed nations have
prompted renewed debate on the role of fiscal rules. Their optimality, however, remains …

In this article, I show that the key aspects of sovereign debt crises can be rationalized as part
of the efficient risk-sharing arrangement between a sovereign borrower and foreign lenders …

Infrequent but turbulent sovereign defaults on domestic creditors were a “forgotten history” in
macroeconomics. We propose a Bewley model in which the government chooses debt and …