Evolutionary game theory is extended to models of two-species interactions where fitnesses
are based on individual characteristics (strategies) rather than on a population dynamic that …

Coevolution is modeled as a continuous game where the fitness‐maximizing strategy of an
individual is assumed to be a function of the strategy of other individuals who are also under …

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although
in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually …

Different aspects and modifications of the definition of an evolutionarily stable (ES) strategy
that have been considered in the literature can be incorporated in a unifying concept which …

Since the fitness of each individual organism in a biological community may be affected by
the strategies of all other individuals in the community, the essential element of a …

Stability criteria have recently been developed for coevolutionary Lotka–Volterra systems
where individual fitness functions are assumed to be linear in the population state. We …

The dynamic stability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is analyzed for a diploid
species under individual viability selection. An individual's viability depends on the …

We investigate the correspondence between discrete-trait games (for example, matrix
games) and continuous-trait games, paying particular attention to the standard criteria for …

Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals
and species. The analysis of ESSs determines which, if any, combinations of behaviors …

Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of
mutations and natural selection has mostly been addressed through the use of the …