This paper considers whether Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy,
or “ESS”, can be used to predict long-run strategy frequencies in large populations whose …

Steven Orzack is at the Dept of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago, 1101 E. 57th
Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA; Elliott Sober is at the Philosophy Dept, University of …

This paper studies the correspondence between Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability
in large and finite populations. Whenever the payoff function of the game that describes the …

The dynamic stability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is analyzed for a diploid
species under individual viability selection. An individual's viability depends on the …

In developing the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, Maynard Smith proposed
formal conditions for stability. These conditions have since been shown to be neither …

The paper investigates whether evolutionary selection, in nature or the market, ensures the
survival of rational agents. It argues that once rationality appears, evolutionary selection can …

Evolutionary stability and efficiency Page 1 Economics Letters 42 (1993) 301-312 01651765/93/$06.00
0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers BV All rights reserved 301 Evolutionary stability and …

Goal: Elucidating the role of the eco-evolutionary feedback loop in determining
evolutionarily stable life histories, with particular reference to the methodological status of …

Stability conditions for equilibria of the evolution of population strategy types are
investigated by means of evolutionary game dynamics for a single haploid species where …