We take explicit account of the way in which the supply of physicians and patients in the
economy affects the design of physician remuneration schemes, highlighting the three‐way …

Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central
concern in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to …

Physician compensation accounts for about one-fifth of all Canadian healthcare spending.
But physicians' decisions, particularly those made by primary care doctors, are the conduit …

Today's health-care marketplace is characterized by a historically remarkable array of
reimbursement systems, practice rules, and insurance organizations. These different …

In recent health care reforms, several countries have replaced pure payment schemes for
physicians (fee-for-service, capitation) by so-called mixed payment schemes. Until now it is …

In recent health care reforms, several countries have replaced pure payment schemes for
physicians (fee-for-service, capitation) by so-called mixed payment schemes. Until now it is …

This article reviews policies on physician payment methods that Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have implemented to promote an efficient …

This paper employs a nationally representative, household‐based dataset in order to test
how the compensation method of both the specialists and the primary care providers affects …

To determine the factors associated with primary care physician self‐selection into different
payment models, we used a panel of eight waves of administrative data for all primary care …

Policy-makers desire an optimal balance of financial incentives to improve productivity and
encourage improved quality in primary care, while also avoiding issues of risk-selection …